This paper attempts to cast light to the relationship between Cournot-Bertrand controversy and monopoly regulation. To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream regulated natural monopoly is trading via two-part tari¤ contracts with a downstream duopoly. Combining our results to those of the existing literature on deregulated markets, we argue that when the downstream competition is in prices, e¢ ciency dictates regulating the monopoly with a marginal cost based pricing scheme. However, this type of regulation leads to signi…cant welfare loss, when the downstream market is characterized by Cournot competition.
1 is unlikely to develop, or if it develops, it will be uneconomic because of the duplication of assets. As explained by Borenstein (2002) , Mulligan and Tsui (2008) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) inter alia, in order to prevent this result, the standard approach of policy making from governments is to develop strong regulatory capabilities so that they can police the revenues and costs of production of the privatized utility …rms and protect consumers from monopoly exploitation. At the same time, there needs to be commitment on the part of government to the regulatory rules to establish credibility on the part of the investors that the regulatory rules will bring about the intended outcome. Where regulatory credibility is weak or absent, private investment decisions will be adversely a¤ected. Yanez (2002) , investigates the spillover e¤ects from price regulation of a single product that is a substitute in consumption and vertically related to the product of another regulated industry such as electricity. Armstrong and Sappington (2006) study the choice between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition, highlighting the role of imperfect information. They argue that the appropriate choice between the two regimes is strongly affected by certain technological and demand characteristics such as the regulator's resources, the e¢ ciency of tax systems and capital markets, and the strength of other prevailing institutions. Moreover, Sappington (2006) argues that when vertically integrated providers 2 are present (i.e., telecommunications industry) the entrant's decision to make or buy critical production inputs may be largely insensitive to the price of these inputs. Lastly, Bergantino et al. (2011) , explore the e¤ectiveness of price and quality cap regulation where a (regulated) incumbent competes with his (unregulated) rivals under two regimes accounting for the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg framework respectively.
In this paper, we study the role of downstream competition in a regulated upstream natural monopoly. A novel aspect of our analysis is that we allow for a two-part tari¤ marginal cost based pricing scheme and we consider the role of its nature, when the monopoly is regulated or deregulated. One additional key aspect of our analysis is that we take into account downstream competition and its intensity (Cournot or Bertrand). We address a number of research questions such as: Is it preferable to regulate upstream natural monopolies (utili- Our result has important policy implications for a number of markets with natural monopoly characteristics such as gas and electricity markets. Speci…cally, gas market is divided into …ve relevant market segments: a) the extraction/production of gas (i.e., upstream market), b) the transportation of gas via high pressure pipelines (i.e., transmission 3 market), c) the transportation on medium and low pressure pipelines (i.e., distribution market), and …nally, d) the storage of gas and e) the supply of gas to customers (i.e., downstream market). 1 In an empirical study, Davis and Muehlegger (2010) , showed that in the market of the US natural gas distribution, which has natural monopoly characteristics with high …xed and low marginal costs (Newbery, 2002; Davis & Muehlegger, 2010) , the ideal regulatory pricing of a marginal cost-based two-part tari¤ holds only for industrial customers. On the other hand, residential and commercial customers pay per-unit prices higher than the marginal cost alongside with a …xed monthly fee. According to Davis and Muehlegger (2010) this pricing policy leads to a huge welfare loss. Given the fact that industrial customers of natural gas (e.g. re…neries, electricity generation, steel industry, cement industry, car industry, etc.) operate in markets characterized by quantity competition due to capacity constraints (Cabral, 2000; Motta, 2004) , whereas commercial and residential customers mostly, compete, in prices, our results indicate that regulation is imposed to the wrong market segment. In other words, the price charged to commercial customers should be regulated with a marginal cost pricing rule, whereas the charges of industrial customers should be deregulated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The model and the equilibrium analysis under regulated and deregulated monopoly are presented in the next two sections. Section 4 compares the results and discusses the policy implications. A robustness analysis is conducted in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 1 It is worth mentioning that the gas supply market can be further divided into several sub-segments: i) supply of gas to dealers (including the local distribution companies), ii) supply of gas to gas-powered electricity plants, iii) supply of gas to large industrial customers, iv) supply of gas to small industrial and commercial customers, and v) supply of gas to household customers (Fafaliou & Polemis, 2009 . In order to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy pairwise proof equilibrium we make the following assumption:
, where 2 (0; 1] is the bargaining power of the upstream …rm and 2 (0; 1) is the rate of substitution between the products of the downstream …rms. 
where i; j = 1; 2 (with i 6 = j), a is a positive constant, p i and q i are the price and quantity of D i , respectively. Finally, we assume that a > c.
Equilibrium analysis
In this section we examine the equilibrium conditions under two di¤erent regimes: a) when the upstream monopoly is regulated via a two-part tari¤ where the wholesale price is …xed to marginal cost and b) when the upstream monopolist trades with its downstream rivals for both the wholesale price and the …xed tari¤.
Regulated monopoly
We assume that the regulator imposes marginal cost pricing on the upstream monopoly.
In this case, the equilibrium wholesale prices under both downstream Cournot (w 6
The equilibrium downstream and upstream pro…ts for each mode M = C; B of downstream competition are:
The equilibrium …xed fee
, solves the following Nash product:
is the downstream monopoly quantity (disagreement point for U . It is the case where an agreement is not reached between U and downstream …rm i and thus downstream …rm j becomes a monopoly).
Solving (11), we get the equilibrium value of the …xed fee for each mode of downstream competition.
Using (3), (5), (6), (12) , (13) and (7)- (9), we obtain the equilibrium upstream and downstream pro…ts:
From (14)- (17), we note that the industry's pro…ts are divided between the upstream monopoly and the downstream …rms according to the relative bargaining power of each side.
Comparing the above results, we end up to the following Propositions: Proposition 1. Under regulated upstream market, the …nal prices are higher (lower) under Cournot (Bertrand) competition while the opposite holds for the equilibrium output.
Proof. Taking the di¤erence p
Proposition 2. Under regulated upstream market, the equilibrium downstream and upstream pro…ts are higher (lower) under Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
Proof. The di¤erence between the downstream pro…ts is
In the case of the upstream market, we have Proof. Consumers'surplus is given by
2 while total welfare is equal to
Total welfare is usually expressed as a weighted sum of consumers' surplus and …rms' pro…ts (see for example Cowan (2001) ), i.e., T W = CS + b , where T W denotes total welfare, CS denotes consumers' surplus, denotes …rms'pro…ts and 0 < b 1. In our analysis b is set equal to 1. However, it can be easily shown that our main …ndings hold for 0 < b < 1.
Similar to conventional wisdom, Proposition 1 informs us that competition in prices is more competitive than competition in quantities. In other words, Cournot competition yields higher prices and lower output than Bertrand competition. In this case, under a regulated two-part tari¤ pricing scheme based on the marginal cost of the upstream monopoly, the downstream …rms are less e¢ cient under Cournot competition. As a consequence, they charge higher prices and they produce a smaller quantity than under Bertrand competition. According to Proposition 2, downstream pro…ts are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. This is due to the fact that the negative impact of the aggressiveness of competition on pro…ts dominates the higher …xed fee charged in Cournot's case. Given Propositions 1, 2 and 3, it turns out that two-tier industries in which the upstream market is perfectly competitive (i.e., upstream marginal cost pricing) are to a major extent equivalent with one-tier industries where Bertrand is more e¢ cient than Cournot competition. In this respect the …xed fee charged by the upstream monopolist does not a¤ect the driving force (see next subsection) of our …ndings. Alipranti et al. (2014) showed that the main results of subsection 3.1 are reversed when the upstream monopoly is deregulated (by a marginal cost based two-part tari¤ pricing scheme) and therefore is free to negotiate its wholesale prices. More speci…cally, their …ndings can be summarized in the following proposition. . The commitment problem is generated by the fact that the upstream monopoly negotiates via non-linear pricing with its downstream competing rivals separately, not publicly. This in turns yields to an opportunistic behavior by the upstream monopoly since the latter has the incentive to o¤er a lower wholesale price to D i than to D j . This will lead to an increase in the level of market share of D i and its pro…tability which will then be transferred upstream by the monopoly through a higher …xed fee to D i .
Deregulated monopoly
It is worth emphasizing that the inability of the upstream monopoly to publicly commit to speci…c contract terms to all downstream customers due to the existence of secret negotiations between the two vertically linked segments of the market (i.e., upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly) prevents U from inducing the maximum overall industry pro…ts (Alipranti et al., 2014) . In other words, the existence of the commitment problem will lead each D i , to an anticipated opportunistic behavior by its upstream monopoly supplier, and thus an o¤er that maximizes the industry's overall pro…ts would have to be turned down 
Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes under the two di¤erent regimes. Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here] Our …ndings have important implications for the type of policies imposed by the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) on natural monopolies such as network industries (electricity, natural gas distribution segments, telecommunications networks, etc.). We argue that when downstream Bertrand competition is present, by applying a non-linear pricing mechanism leading to a marginal price equal to marginal cost, the NRAs increase the level of production and eliminate the deadweight loss associated with the existence of the (upstream) monopoly.
In such cases (e.g., commercial and residential customers of natural gas) the NRAs can e¢ ciently allow the monopolist to recoup its …xed costs by charging …xed fees that do not depend on the level of production (Davis & Muehlegger, 2010) . On the other hand, when downstream Cournot competition is present (e.g., industrial customers of natural gas) and customers are paying both a …xed monthly fee and a price per unit equal to marginal cost of the upstream monopoly, our …ndings reveal that a two-part tari¤ pricing scheme leads to signi…cant welfare loss. In other words, in the imposition of a two-part tari¤ marginal cost pricing scheme, the regulatory authorities should indeed take into account the nature of downstream competition. Our results indicate that the NRAs should be skeptical on the type of regulation in the two-tier industries. Similarly, they indicate that it is important 14 in the evaluation of an e¤ective regulatory scheme that the downstream rivals compete in prices rather than quantities because otherwise di¤erent policy implications could be drawn.
Linear pricing
To further check for the robustness of our …ndings, we consider the case where the upstream monopolist trades with the downstream …rms via linear contracts. By dropping F (the …xed tari¤) and conducting the same analysis as above, we get the following equations:
T W C lreg = (a c)
where 2 5)] and subscripts lreg and lwreg denote the existence and the absence of regulation in the upstream monopoly, respectively. It can be easily shown that 26-29 are equivalent to those generated in the case of non-linear marginal cost pricing (section 3.1).
Given this result and by performing tedious calculations, we get CS [ Figures 1 to 6 about here]
The absence of the …xed fee in the case where trading occurs via linear contracts, eliminates the commitment problem and leads to results consistent with conventional wisdom (Bertrand competition is more e¢ cient than Cournot competition).
Furthermore, the level of consumers'surplus and total welfare remain unchanged under marginal cost pricing regardless of the type of the tari¤ charged by the upstream monopoly (i.e., linear or non-linear). More speci…cally, when trading occurs via linear contracts, the 4 We use …gures instead of algebraic expressions for reader-friendly purposes.
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…xed tari¤ representing the pro…ts of the monopoly under non-linear tari¤s is distributed to the downstream …rms. However, this change does not alter the …nal results.
In conclusion, the dilemma of regulation presented in section 4 does not exist under linear contracts; e¢ ciency dictates regulation of the upstream monopoly regardless of the type of the downstream competition.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate whether the decision of regulating or deregulating an upstream monopoly is based on the nature of the downstream competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand).
To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream 
